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Wakelam: No easy thing

No easy thing
Senior Command in the Canadian Army, 1939-1945
Randall Wakelam

H

istorians have tended to equate
success with winning battles,
failure with defeat, and yet there
is much more to being successful
in senior appointments than just
battlefield victory. Success seems to
call for a trilogy of abilities: the ability
to defend national interests in the
highest military (and often political)
circles; the ability to organize and
manage forces both before and
during combat; and the ability to
lead both directly and indirectly
those who have to implement the
plans. Are we right to apply this
three-pillared standard? This article
attempts to answer that question
by reviewing the performance of
the three generals who commanded
First Canadian Army during the
Second World War: Generals A.G.L.
McNaughton and H.D.G. Crerar, and
Lieutenant-General G.G. Simonds.1
While the junior man of the group
– Guy Simonds – appeared from
the historical record to be the most
successful and best regarded, what
criteria have been used in these
determinations?
It is worthwhile to consider
the thoughts of three distinguished
thinkers (two of them practitioners):
Field Marshal Sir Archibald Wavell,
historian Martin van Creveld, and
Guy Simonds. In the 1939 Lees
Knowles Lectures Wavell focussed

Abstract: There is relatively little
Canadian military history which looks
specifically at the questions and
themes surrounding senior command
(commanders of large formations
of troops – normally generals
or lieutenant-generals). Current
interpretations call for a trilogy
of abilities: the ability to defend
national interests in the highest
military (and often political) circles;
the ability to organize and manage
forces both before and during combat;
and the ability to lead both directly
and indirectly those who have to
implement the plans. Were Canadians
then, and are historians today, right
to apply this multiple standard? This
article looks at the three officers
who commanded First Canadian
Army during the Second World War:
Generals A.G.L. McNaughton, H.D.G.
Crerar and G.G. Simonds. Where these
commanders might well possess one
or two of these abilities they could as
easily have little competence in the
third. Overall Crerar comes out as the
best of the three.

on three aspects of generalship:
personal qualities; subordinates;
and political masters. But he also
quoted from Socrates who had said
that “the general must know how
to get his men their rations and
every other kind of stores needed
for war.”2 Wavell felt that effective
administration – providing for an
army’s needs – was the “real crux of
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generalship.”3 Nonetheless, generals
also needed a range of personal
attributes: mental and physical
robustness, physical courage, health
and youth, courage of convictions,
knowledge of humanity and fighting
spirit.4 These were necessary to “keep
strict, though not necessarily stern
discipline,…[and give ungrudging]
praise where praise is due,” be visible
to the troops, avoid sarcasm and keep
the soldiers informed.5 These things,
he said, were hard to do given that
generals were far less visible to their
soldiers than in times past. Finally,
Wavell reminded his audience that
the general and the politician worked
in unique yet overlapping spheres
and that cooperation was of vital
importance for the successful conduct
of the war.6 Wavell painted a picture
of a complex and demanding range
of competencies.
In February 1944 Guy Simonds,
shortly after assuming command
of 2 Canadian Corps, prepared a
summary of what he saw as the
“Essential Qualities in the Leader.”7
All were necessary for success.
Some, such as knowledge, physical
fitness and weapons skills, could be
learned or “acquired” while others
were “inherent.” Among the latter
were “moral” qualities including
“resolution” and “determination”:
“A man who originates good ideas
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instilling confidence
and intentions but who
and providing guidance
is unable to get them
and direction, and
put into practice may be
be managers of large
useful in a pure research
and multidimensional
or in an advisory
organizations. They
capacity, but is quite
must have a mastery
useless in any executive
of the nature and
command.”8 In addition
functions of military
to understanding
organizations and of
warfighting doctrine
warfighting, and when
a commander “must
needed of the interface
know how to command
between military and
– how to delegate to his
political controls.
subordinates and his
During the war there
staff, how to control,
was one other criterion
how to position himself
which was used to
on the battlefield
assess Canadian and all
and make use of his
Commonwealth senior
communications, and,
commanders and that
most importantly
was the British penchant
of all, he must have
for experience. It was
an understanding of
seen by the British as
human nature and
somewhere between
how to ‘get at’ men.”9
odd and unacceptable
Simonds’ successful
to appoint senior
commander thus
commanders who had
seemed to be someone
not experienced combat
who could use his
and commanded
knowledge of warfare
at lower levels. For
to come up with
Canadians, who had
appropriate solutions
lived in peace for two
to problems and then
decades this was a hard
use the people around
hurdle to get over.
him to turn these ideas
Lieutenant-General Andrew McNaughton was the first to command First
When “Andy”
into effective results.
Canadian Army. He was found wanting in a number of areas and replaced
in 1943.
McNaughton was
Historian Martin
appointed general
van Creveld wrote in
officer commanding-in-chief (GOCCommand in War that “First, command
says, the challenge is to find answers
in-C) of First Canadian Army on 6
must arrange and coordinate
to these questions without resorting
April 1942 it marked the culmination
everything an army needs to exist…
to a few examples as this sampling
of almost three decades of military
Second, command enables the army
can “distort reality.” To study
service to Canada. After a stint
to carry out its proper mission [– the
command and commanders is not
as head of the National Research
efficient destruction of the enemy
an easy undertaking he concludes.
Council in the late 1930s McNaughton
force].”10 Van Creveld believed that
“To make the task manageable, it is
returned to uniformed service in 1939
necessary to limit the analysis to the
history is not like social science and
first as GOC of 1st Canadian Infantry
purely military side of things.”12
that there should be no reluctance to
Division and then as commander of 1st
look at specifics rather than broad
Synthesizing these models,
Canadian Corps. Serving in England
trends: “a study of command cannot
it seems that commanders must,
McNaughton was responsible for
avoid asking the down to earth
implicitly or explicitly, demonstrate
both training the growing Canadian
questions: who ordered whom to do
a considerable and well developed
army and for representing the needs
what, when, by what means, on the
intellect which permits them to deal
and interests of the army to Canadian
basis of what information, what for,
with complex situations. They must
11
politicians and British leaders. When
and to what ends.” Conversely, he
also be able to lead their subordinates,
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he was relieved of command of
First Canadian Army at the end
of 1943 there were two principal
reasons: his disagreement with the
Canadian government over the
splitting of the Army, which would
allow 1 Canadian Corps to gain
battle experience in Italy while at the
same time demonstrating Canada’s
resolve in the conduct of the war, and
his miscues as the head of an army
sized formation during a major field
exercise in England earlier that year.
McNaughton did not seem able
or willing during 1943 to accept
Ottawa’s decision that it was in
Canada’s best interests to send a
corps to the Mediterranean theatre.
Rather, the nationalistic general saw
the splitting of the Canadian army
as blow to Canadian prestige. This
situation, and other disagreements
with political leaders and bureaucrats,
suggest that McNaughton could be
prone to seeing things his own way
regardless of what the government
wanted.13 His actual falling out over
the despatch of 1 Corps to Italy left
him in clear opposition to confirmed
government policy. He might have
weathered these debates but for his
ineffectiveness as commander of First
Canadian Army.
McNaughton’s ability as a
battlefield commander had been
a concern since 1941. General Sir
Alan Brooke, the British chief of the
imperial general staff (CIGS) cast a
critical eye on all senior commanders
and was not afraid of culling those
whom he thought incapable of
their tasks.14 Brooke had started to
question McNaughton’s effectiveness
as early as April 1941 when he
watched an exercise commanded
by McNaughton: “Rather depressed
at the standard of training and
efficiency of the Canadian Divisional
and Brigade Commanders.”
“Unfortunately as long as
MacNaughton [sic] commanded
the Corps there is not much chance
for improvement. He could not see
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the deficiency in training and was
no judge of the qualities required
of a Commander.”15 McNaughton’s
training programme did not include
subunit or unit training and as a
result leaders at those levels had no
chance to develop their skills in doing
quick estimates and hasty attacks. 16
McNaughton “lacked the required
qualities of command.”17
McNaughton’s first and only
experience where he actually
commanded First Canadian Army in
the field took place in 1943. Exercise
Spartan has been well documented
and allows us to look specifically at
McNaughton’s personal role during
these large manoeuvres. Prior to the
exercise he decided to include the
fledgling 2 Canadian Corps in his
three corps force even though it had
never exercised even on its own.
McNaughton’s biographer views
this decision as well reasoned, the
general feeling that the learning
opportunities would more than offset
any teething problems .18 Historian
Jack English on the other hand calls
the value of 2 Corps’ participation
“questionable.”19
During the exercise the real weak
link turned out to be McNaughton
himself. He has been criticized,
particularly by English, for his
decision and counter-decision to
pass 2 Corps through the rear area of
1 Corps; he seemed to have no sense
of the possible catastrophe of such
a manoeuvre. English also criticizes
the general for being all too ready
to become engrossed by technical
details, citing McNaughton’s decision
to visit bridging operations rather
than remain focused on army level
matters.20
The full extent of McNaughton’s
difficulties as a commander are
apparent in eyewitness accounts
which cite periods of indecision,
orders issued and rescinded, trips
forward for insignificant reasons, and
daily instructions transmitted so late
that it was virtually impossible for

subordinate formations to adequately
prepare for the next day’s action.21
Brooke was in McNaughton’s HQ,
just as the Canadian was cancelling
2 Corps’ move across 1 Corps’ rear.22
After seeing McNaughton in action
Brooke recorded: “He does not
know how to begin to cope with the
job and is tying his force up into the
most awful muddle!” “I felt that I
could not accept the responsibility
of allowing the Canadian Army to
go into action under his orders.”
This level of detail is exactly the
precision which historians should
strive to find and use if we want
to really begin to understand what
commanders thought, said, and did
as they attempted to command.
Fate led to the political/military
and operational challenges which
confronted the general at virtually the
same time.23 Always acknowledged
as a popular leader McNaughton
had nonetheless failed on at least two
counts within our model.
A junior officer in the Great War,
H.D.G. “Harry” Crerar remained
in uniform becoming known as
Canada’s pre-eminent interwar staff
officer. Rising to CGS in the early war
years he developed and subsequently
gained government approval for the
structure of the Canadian Army. In
December 1941 he moved to England
to command 2nd Canadian Infantry
Division, taking command of 1
Canadian Corps in April 1942. He
took that corps to Italy at the end of
1943 and then returned to England
replacing McNaughton as Army
commander. He commanded the
Army during the entire campaign in
North West Europe except for two
periods of illness.
Crerar had an ability to sense
the political direction of the
government and then factor with it
the related military and international
considerations.24 During his time as
CGS he provided advice on three
major issues: the implementation of
the National Resources Mobilization
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conference called by
Act; the creation of a
Montgomery. While
five division army in
C.P. Stacey believes the
Britain along side a
conference was of little
robust domestic defence
value, Montgomery
force; and the decision
could not accept that
to despatch troops to
Crerar’s presence at
Hong Kong. 25 In the
Dieppe with 2nd
latter circumstance
Canadian Infantry
Crerar had examined
Division was of more
the defence of Imperial
importance to the
interests in the Pacific
Canadian national
as part of his year at
commander. Crerar
the Imperial Defence
refused to back down
College in 1934 and
and threatened to take
subsequently stayed
the matter to higher
abreast of issues while
authorities. To his
director of military
credit, Montgomery
operations and
sent a written apology.
intelligence in Ottawa.26
While Brooke’s
In 1941 he did a
biographer indicates
detailed reassessment:
that the CIGS was happy
he did not dismiss the
to see Crerar, a friend
risks, but based his
and colleague since the
advice on strategic
27
First War, take over
level intelligence.
from McNaughton, 33
Once the government
accepted the request
Montgomery was
Crerar examined the
apparently more
tactical and technical
cautious. Reporting to
Lieutenant-General H.D.G. “Harry” Crerar succeeded McNaughton
aspects of the matter.
Brooke at the end of
and led First Canadian Army until the end of the war.
Concluding it to be a
1943 he said: “The more
relatively low risk task
I think of Harry Crerar
he approved the use of two battalions
the more I am convinced that he is
British superiors and particularly
then doing garrison duty elsewhere,
quite unfit to command an army in
Montgomery could not seem to
thus minimizing any impact on the
the field at present…he wants a lot of
accept.30 Crerar was as determined a
raising of 4th Canadian Division
teaching; I taught him about training;
nationalist as McNaughton, but that
which was going on at the same
Oliver Leese [the Commander of
he used “a more balanced approach”
time. 28 In hindsight Hong Kong
Eighth Army in Italy at that time]
ensuring that he maintained good
will have to teach him the practical
relations while also exercising his
was not a low risk situation, but
side of war.”34 At the end of July 1944
prerogative a senior Canadian.31
the British and the Americans, both
of whom had long experience in
Crerar got into two flaps early on
Montgomery was again reporting to
the region, were caught similarly
as Army commander. On his first day
Brooke on Crerar’s progress, this time
unprepared by the “magnitude of
in Normandy he became embroiled
after the Crocker incident:
Japanese irrationality.”29
in an argument with his immediate
subordinate Lieutenant-General J.T.
The other half of Crerar’s war
fighting his first battle and it is
Crocker of 1 British Corps. After
involved his time as corps and army
the first appearance in history
Montgomery’s intercession they
commander. Many criticisms have
of a Canadian Army H.Q. He is
smoothed over the issue and got
been heaped on his performance.
desperately anxious that it should
on well until Crocker’s corps left
Some have to do with his personality
succeed. He is so anxious that he
First Canadian Army the following
and others are related to the fact that
worries himself all day!!
March.32 Crerar fell afoul of Monty by
like McNaughton he was caught
between being a field commander and
later attending a Canadian ceremony
Montgomery’s biographer concludes
a national commander, something his
at Dieppe, which conflicted with a
that “Crerar’s naïveté about battle
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was something Monty felt he could
cure…”35 We are left to assume that
while Crerar was not a shining light
he was not so bad that he needed
replacing as had McNaughton.
These comments were much
different than those which Monty
and others had made in 1942 and
1943. Speaking of Crerar’s Beaver
exercises run in early 1942 when
he was replacing McNaughton
as corps commander, the British
general found them to be “logical
and progressive.” During this same
period Montgomery made the rounds
of Canadian formations and units and
produced his list of those who should
be relieved. Crerar was given the task
and got on with it.36 Shortly after,
Montgomery recorded praise for
Crerar at the end of the Canadian’s
first test as a corps commander in
Exercise Tiger in May 1942. “‘You
did splendidly … when I say you
did well I mean it.’” At the same time
Monty did not report any issues to
Brooke, a technique he used often
when displeased with subordinates.37
The next year, Brooke, Montgomery
and Paget also noted Crerar’s abilities
during exercise Spartan. Crerar’s
personal development and training
plan for the corps paid off, Brooke
noted that “Crerar had ‘improved the
corps out of all recognition.’”38
Lieutenant-General Sir Brian
Horrocks, Britain’s most successful
and respected corps commander, was
attached to First Canadian Army for
Operation Veritable in the Rhineland
and came to respect Crerar during the
fighting.
[Crerar] was always very wellinformed because, in spite of the
bad weather, he made constant
flights over the battlefield in
a small observation aircraft…I
found myself getting very tired
and irritable. But Crerar bore with
me patiently.39
…Crerar… has always been much
underrated, largely because he was
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the exact opposite to Montgomery.
He hated publicity, but was full
of common sense and always
prepared to listen to the views of
his subordinate commanders.40

Horrocks was equally complimentary
about the extensive Canadian
build-up and deception plan for
the operation.41 Horrocks was not
the only one to notice. Eisenhower
offered praise that Crerar had
commanded the largest force ever
grouped under a Canadian general:
“It speaks volumes for your skill
and determination.”42 Terry Copp
commented that while Crerar was
not close to operations, in his role
as army commander “he managed
a highly effective staff that proved
capable of meeting the most difficult
challenges.”43 British officers posted
to Crerar headquarters after D Day
came to recognize that Crerar’s
staff “were an outstanding group of
men who could hold their own with
any army HQ under Eisenhower’s
c o m m a n d . ” 44 W e c a n p e r h a p s
presume that after six months in
operations Crerar had settled down
to the business of running an army.
Canadian biographies and
memoirs present a different,
perhaps more personality driven,
view. Dominick Graham, Simond’s
biographer, wrote that during the
opening phases of the fall 1944
Scheldt campaign “Crerar had shown
no initiative. A plodding man who
had not been given a positive order
his response to Montgomery’s call to
mask the lesser ports and get on with
the Scheldt was not dynamic.”45
Major-General George Kitching,
who had been a senior staff officer
and divisional commander under
Simonds, called Crerar a kind but
uninspiring commander, who in
1943 and early 1944 had become
increasingly jealous of the younger
Simonds. 46 Kitching suggests that
this jealousy had begun even earlier
when in 1942 Simonds, then a staff

officer, was the “brain” behind
Crerar’s success in England.47 Despite
this criticism Kitching reports that
Crerar was “kindness itself” when
offering moral support after Kitching
had been sacked in July 1944 by
Simonds. 48 Similarly, Crerar used
a “considered” approach when
replacing Major-General Dan Spry
as head of 3rd Canadian Infantry
Division. Simonds insisted that Spry
be replaced after poor performance in
the Hochwald. Crerar, as he had done
in other cases, orchestrated the move
so that it would achieve the desired
effect with minimum impact on the
man.49 In selecting the new GOC of
5th Canadian Armoured Division in
early 1944, Crerar listened to what
others had to say and amended
his choice, selecting Brigadier B.M.
Hoffmeister. Then, in announcing the
job to Hoffmeister he met the man at
a set of map coordinates, shook hands
and sat down for a chat. This does not
represent a standoffish leadership
style.50 From these examples it can be
seen that Crerar was ready to reward
and replace. That he did so in a careful
and quiet way, compared to the
more sensational Montgomery and
Simonds, “obscured his willingness”
to do so.51
By the end of 1944 Crerar had
returned from a bout of dysentery
and was in charge of an army that
had grown to close to half a million
men with several British and allied
divisions under his command.
Crerar was well suited for the task:
“Few commanders were as qualified
to handle an operation of such
complexity – and precariousness.”52
Indeed, as the battle began to go
wrong Crerar was obliged to make
a decision about whether he would
throw support behind Horrocks
should Simonds not achieve the
anticipated advance. This has been
described as a “threat” to Simonds,53
but clearly Crerar was stating the
obvious. He had two axes of advance
within his sector and if one failed
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the respect of Sir Brian
he would logically
Horrocks. These same
reinforce the other.
examples would also
Ultimately he would
appear to demonstrate
place Simonds in the van
a competency of
in an assault through
warfighting and of
the Hochwald.54
the military-political
Paul Dickson’s
interface. Did he meet
PhD thesis on
the challenges of
Crerar, “The Limits
leadership? He quietly
of Professionalism,”
got on with selecting,
offers some additional
developing, and, where
p e r s p e c t i v e s . 55 F o r
necessary, replacing his
example, Crerar’s
subordinates. Did he
lack of operational
pass the British opinion
activity and apparent
test? Both Montgomery
attention to paperwork
and Brooke appear
while commanding
to have found him
1 Canadian Corps
adequate. If not, why
briefly in Italy can
did he keep his job
be explained, says
during Normandy and
Dickson, first because
go on to command
the corps was not in the
nearly half a million
line for most of the time
men in the Rhineland?
Crerar was in command
In reaching this
and also by the fact
conclusion we must
that Crerar had a new
base our assessment
brigadier-general staff
on only the barest
and was thus forced
witness of Crerar’s
to take on more of the
actual performance.
day to day coordination
Lieutenant-General Guy Simonds briefly commanded First Canadian Army
What did he do during
of corps activities than
during the fall of 1944 when Crerar required hospitalization.
the Rhineland battles?
he might normally
56
We know that he made
have done. Dickson
artillery concentrations which he
daily flights over the battlefield
had developed in Italy and which
reports how Crerar matured as a
and that he commanded the largest
Dickson has not found used by other
corps commander shaping his staff
army ever put under the control of
armies. 59 Dickson concludes that
by juggling between giving them
a Canadian general. Paul Dickson’s
some leeway and lecturing them
while at 1 Canadian Corps Crerar
work has begun to give us detailed
in something of a teacher-student
“steadily immersed himself in the
insight into the man and his actions,
ma n n e r . 5 7 C r e r a r ’s su g g e st i on
practice of command…To his credit,
but there are many questions which
he proved to be flexible and open to
that Italian operations bore some
remain, and which need to be
new ideas. The inclusive nature of
resemblance to Great War conditions
answered if we are to obtain a precise
his professionalism was evident as he
was misinterpreted by those ignorant
understanding of Harry Crerar’s
absorbed and implemented training
of the mobile operations conducted in
apparent success.
policy and operational developments
the closing stages of that war. “Crerar
60
Guy Simonds was the third and
throughout the Corps.”
was not attempting to force thinking
last to have command, if temporarily,
towards rigid trench warfare, but
Crerar may have been criticized
of First Canadian Army. An acting
towards the flexible but coordinated
but he did seem successful in staff
major when war broke out he
strengths of [1918 mobile] doctrine.”58
and line appointments. Did he
advanced at an amazing rate to take
have intellect? Apparently so, if we
Crerar went on to use similar tactics
command of 2 Canadian Corps in
accept that he was a key player in
in the Rhineland battle, employing
January 1944. Later that year, and
defence policy formulation and if
counter battery techniques based
again in the spring of 1945, he would
we acknowledge that he learned
on proven tactics from 1917-18,
replace Crerar when the latter fell ill.
enough on the battlefield to gain
and also instituting “pepper-pot”
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Despite these accomplishments,
Simonds had both command and
leadership problems in Sicily while
leading 1st Canadian Division. Even
George Kitching, Simonds’ GSO 1,
feet that his boss made some tactical
errors. Simonds’ performance in Sicily
has been described as that of a young
general who was innovative and
daring, but overly rigid in sticking to
a plan that might not be working.61 He
would develop a plan himself without
input from staff or subordinate
COs before issuing orders. This
would have had a negative impact
on morale. By comparison many
British commanders within Eighth
Army were less formal and more
collaborative.62 Admittedly, Simonds
was under considerable stress: this
was his first time in command in
battle, with Canadian and British
seniors watching and testing him.63
From Normandy to the Rhineland
Simonds led both corps and army.
In doing so he has been described
as “tough, young, smart ruthless
and intolerant of inefficiency.” 64
Early on, to solve the problems of
cracking through the Germans south
of Caen, his “fertile mind conjured
up a hat full of tricks, many of them
untried.”65 In the Scheldt campaign,
he is again credited with a brilliant
solution, which he had to push
forward with determination until
his seniors accepted it. 66 Dickson,
though a proponent of Crerar,
concludes, that Simonds did well
in replacing his superior: “by most
accounts, Simonds’ assumption of
command reinvigorated the army
HQ; where Crerar managed, Simonds
commanded.”67
English believes that Simonds’
policy directives “reflected originality,
c l a r i t y a n d c o m p l e t e n e s s . ” 68
Similarly, Copp says “Simonds was
an innovative leader who approached
each operation in a problem solving
mode.” The general “did not hesitate
to modify…doctrine and improvise
new methods.” 69 While not free from
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failures, Simonds was very capable
in exploiting the strengths of the
fighting arms, but, says English, he
did have to use a directive approach
when working with less capable
subordinate commanders. One
could conclude that Simonds was
forced into a command style that
was skewed towards autocracy by
presence of subordinates who were
in need of being led.
Terry Copp’s The Brigade gives
us a balanced view of the young
Canadian citing the general’s own
chief of staff, Brigadier N.E. Roger,
who appreciated Simonds’ ability
to reduce a problem to the essential,
establish a “clear-cut objective” and
issue direction in “simple and direct
terms.”70 On the other hand, Simonds
seemed to possess “overwhelming
self-confidence and a degree of
arrogance which did not encourage
expressions of dissent. Simonds did
not attempt to lead; he sought only to
command.”71 On the matter of errors
during Operation Spring, Copp feels
that Simonds acted properly based
on the fragmentary information
he had available: “He was wrong
but this was not an unreasonable
decision.” 72 Moreover, Copp says
that while Simonds’ Operation
Spring was a failure the general
took the hard lessons from it and
applied them effectively in Operation
Totalize. This “demonstrate[d] that
Simonds could learn and grow as a
corps commander.”73 Looking at a
tough and inflexible reinforcement
reception programme, intended
to minimize immediate casualties
among new soldiers, Copp records
an empathetic Simonds: “I fully
appreciate…that Commanding
Officers have had little time to think
about things other than the battle in
which they are engaged.”74
Both Horrocks and Montgomery
spoke highly of Simonds. Montgomery
recorded: “The Canadian Army
produced only one general fit to
hold high command in the Second

World War - Guy Simonds.”75 To read
just this statement would suggest,
perhaps, that Monty found no fault
with the young Canadian, but this
was not the case. Having earlier
overturned Simonds’ decision to
sack a brigadier in Italy, Montgomery
wrote: “Simmonds [sic] is a young
and very inexperienced Divisional
general and has much to learn about
command.”76 Later, in France and
Germany, Horrocks found him to be
a “first-class commander with a most
original brain and full of initiative.”77
Canadian biographies and
memoirs carry two themes: innovative
and hard driving commander; cold
and uninspiring leader. MajorGeneral Harry Foster’s comments are
indicative.
He had that amazing ability of
being able to analyze any given
situation swiftly and accurately,
cutting through irrelevancies to
the heart of the problem, then
making up his mind. His orders
were always clear, concise –
straight to the point. But he was a
hard man to work for.
The performance standards
and expectations he set for his
subordinate commanders were so
high it was impossible to satisfy
him. …I tried to talk to him
privately as a friend about the way
he ran roughshod over one of my
own brigadiers and a regimental
commander. He seemed genuinely
surprised. “Somebody had to
speak to them, Harry. I did it
because you didn’t.”78

Indeed, Simonds was not even
above sacking his protégé George
Kitching when the latter proved
incapable of running 4th Armoured
Division in Normandy. 79 Despite
this Kitching remained a believer in
Simonds, calling him “a first-class
commander” who reached “the top
rank” amongst his peers. Kitching
took pains to point out Simonds’
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By the criteria set out in this article, Crerar rates as Canada’s best senior commander. He got on well in and with Ottawa, had a firm
understanding of the military profession, displayed an ability to manage large, complex organizations and battles and employed a
command style that earned the respect of his fellow commanders.
This photo shows the senior officers of First Canadian Army photographed at the end of the war. (l. to r. - seated) H.S. Maczek, G.G.
Simonds, H.D.G. Crerar, C. Foulkes, B.M. Hoffmeister; (standing) R.H. Keefler, A.B. Matthews, H.W. Foster, R.W. Moncel, S.B. Rawlins.

reservation and shyness, often seen as
aloofness while in fact friends knew
him to be “warm and generous.”80
Perhaps these traits influenced him to
keep on Major-General Rod Keller in
Normandy; here he was not prepared
to sack one of his subordinates
despite the concerns of his seniors.81
But more often Simonds rubbed
the wrong way. Major-General Bert
Hoffmeister, arguably Canada’s best
division commander, did not enjoy
working for Simonds. “[Hoffmeister]
found Simonds rigid, fond of calling
commanders back for direction,
less likely to delegate responsibility
to subordinate commanders and
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abrupt.” Personal relations between
the two were “not good.” “Simonds
used fear; Hoffmeister built teams.”82
In 1946 Simonds set down
his own retrospective analysis of
Operation Spring. He wrote with
conviction that “non-observance of
[a number of] tactical measures was
in my opinion the cause of the failure
… in operation ‘SPRING.’” 83 His
conclusion was cautious:
I would prefer to make no statement
on the subject for I dislike even
suggesting criticism of those who
lost their lives, but if a statement
is required from me as a matter of

record, I consider that the losses were
unnecessarily heavy and the results
achieved disappointing. Such losses
were not inherent in the plan nor in
its intended execution.84

The sorts of “policy in the
tactical handling of troops and
in administration generally”
that Simonds wanted he had
described personally to officers of
3rd Canadian Infantry Division and
2nd Canadian Armoured Brigade
when those formations joined the
Corps on 16 July 1944.85 While there
is some discussion of tactical doctrine
the tone of the address is akin to a
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commander giving his subordinates
a refresher on what to expect. That
Simonds took the time to have this
sort of “chat” is an indication of the
importance he placed on being a
visible and proactive commander.
Conversely, we see little humanity in
Simonds in telling officers who had
just come out of some hard fighting
that he was prepared to incur up to
70 per cent casualties if that meant
winning a battle. Copp believes
that this callous approach “must
have met with a mixed reception,”
particularly to men who were not
new to Normandy, but new to
Simonds’ corps.86
How then should we measure
Simonds’ success as a commander? It
seems clear that he had a considerable
intellect and that he applied it to
well developed effect in the conduct
of large scale military operations.
His innovations, both technical
and tactical, in France and Belgium
remain examples of what generals are
supposed to do: find ways to resolve
battlefield impasses. Commander of
the army on only two occasions and
for limited periods he did not have to
deal in any significant way with the
Canadian government and thus we
cannot make any conclusions about
his success in this area. It is worth
noting, however, that after the war he
was not selected as CGS, apparently
at Crerar’s suggestion.87 When he did
assume that appointment in 1951 his
tenure while of reasonable length was
not smooth.
While Simonds was a brilliant
master of the military art, he was
less than perfect as a leader. His
run-ins with subordinates, and
superiors, suggest that he was not
particularly comfortable in the sorts of
interpersonal relationships required
of high command. He knew what
he was looking for in his followers,
but got it more by direction and
intimidation than by cooperation and
collaboration. This may well have
been a direct result of the relative
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inexperience of those over whom he
was given command. His job, after
all, was not to be popular but to help
win the war while getting as many
as possible of those for whom he was
responsible back to Canada in one
piece.
Was Simonds a successful
commander? Yes, but perhaps only
in the circumstances. As Terry Copp
concludes, “Simonds lacked the
human touch that distinguishes
great leaders, but no other corps
commander displayed such technical
competence and flexibility.”88
Two questions were asked at the
beginning of this article: was it right
to apply a three facetted measure
of success when assessing senior
military commanders; and, if yes,
which of the three army commanders
had been the most successful?
It seems clear that Andy
McNaughton – while a man of great
intellect and personal popularity –
was not suited either to command
(and manage) a large and complex
field army, or to be that army’s
spokesman when dealing with the
national government in Ottawa.
Guy Simonds was never faced, in
a protracted way, with that political
challenge, although when his time
came in the 1950s he experienced
mixed success. As a battlefield
manager he was the best Canada
produced and was apparently as
good as any the British could field. As
one charged with the development
of an effective working relationship
with his subordinates he seemed able
to direct with cold precision, but was
generally unable or unwilling to lead
with a human touch. He was not a
failed commander, but he was less
than ideal.
This leaves Harry Crerar who
got on well in and with Ottawa, had
a firm understanding of the military
profession, displayed an ability to
manage large complex organizations
and battles and employed a command
style that earned the respect of

Horrocks, the pre-eminent British
corps commander. Least known of
our three generals Crerar seems,
nonetheless, to have been the most
effective of the three commanders
when our criteria for success are
applied.
Terry Copp and others remind us
that battle breaks down into a series
of small unique combats.89 If, then,
soldiers do not fight for their nation
or regiment, but rather for those with
whom they serve, is it not reasonable
to modify this model to suggest
that commanders do not command
their armies directly, but rather they
influence and direct a small group
of immediate subordinates through
whom the commander’s intent is,
hopefully, successfully transmitted.
If this is so, then surely it leaves us
with important questions for the
accurate measurement of command
effectiveness and a commander’s
success. We are a long way from a
complete picture of success in high
command.
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